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Philosophy’s task is at present not easily qualified. As scientific endeavors have 
led to results that reduce philosophical pursuits in many cases to little more 
than a reflection without practical outcomes, it must reflect on its own enter-
prise. What is philosophy’s present role? Philosophers are typically interested 
in truth. The question presents itself why someone should be interested in a 
‘truth’ beyond the standards1 the sciences have apparently adapted (viz., accept 
a theory as long as it works and no superior one is envisaged).
Is the quest for ‘truth’ merely the need to solve a puzzle, or does grasping it 
simply provide a stable result, so that one can rest assured and need not look 
further? In any event, it seems difficult to find a task here for philosophy that is 
not exhausted by the sciences. Of course, there are questions they have not even 
begun to deal with – the most important ones in life, which may, ironically, be 
of such a nature that they cannot be answered at all –, but philosophy’s track 
record in that department is not impressive either, to put it mildly, philosophers 
providing answers without agreeing on the criteria to determine their merit. It 
is, then, necessary to see how philosophy’s presence may be justified. That is the 
question this article attempts to answer.
1. Disintegration
‘Philosophy’s end’ can be taken to mean (at least) three things. First, one may 
speak of the end of philosophy in the sense of its goal. Such a goal may be said 
to be happiness.2 This is not what I mean here. Second, the end of philosophy 
may be identified with the completion (‘Vollendung’) of metaphysics.3 There is 
a common ground with my position in this article, although I do not subscribe 
to this outcome. Third, philosophy’s end in the sense of its ending can be said 
to follow from its increasingly specialist outlook. It is this interpretation that is 
the focus of this article.
1 I say ‘standards’ (plural) as the social sciences and the exact sciences have different 
degrees of exactness (and within these categories, further varying degrees can be 
distinguished).
2 Aristotle 1960, 1097a, 1097b.
3 Heidegger 2007, 70.
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In the case of the sciences, the same process has manifested itself. In order 
to be able to implement the procedures that have been developed in the field of 
medicine, e. g., specializations and subspecializations have come to the fore. This 
is an example of an external element that leads to specialization, which is exem-
plary for sciences’ (sub)specializations. In the case of medicine, it is clear how this 
works: if a particular treatment (the external element in this case) becomes avail-
able, one wants to have it available, so that doctors need to master the knowledge 
and skills involved; as more treatments are developed, the need for specialization 
increases. In turn, these specialists have the opportunity to research more specif-
ically than before, so that the process of specialization is again increased.
Such external elements are apparently lacking in philosophy. In its case, con-
versely, specializations seem to have been prompted by ongoing debates with 
ever new viewpoints, a dialectical process if you will, although with an apparent 
lack of progress. ‘Progress’ is, of course, a difficult notion, but in the case of 
the sciences, the external elements can point out wherein it may consist (one 
would, for instance (ceteris paribus), prefer a medical treatment in the present 
day and age, with the present resources available, to a treatment in an earlier 
period of time). Some of the discussions that have started with, e. g., Plato, 
Descartes or Berkeley4 have not been concluded; those that may be said to have 
been concluded have received an answer from one or more sciences, whether 
they be psychology, physics or other sciences. This does not mean, incidentally, 
that such discussions are forever concluded, since scientific insights are provi-
sory and must be abandoned once superior explanations become available, but 
it does mean that they are not, or at least not exclusively, considered to be of a 
philosophical nature anymore.
Those philosophical quandaries that remain have become increasingly intri-
cate, but have not been resolved. In fact, it may be argued that a philosophical 
issue can only be solved if a scientific response is provided.5 The question what 
knowledge is, e. g., has led to many characterizations, such that they may be 
said to testify to an increasing awareness of the difficulties involved in provid-
ing a definitive account.6 The notion of knowledge as a justified belief, e. g., 
4 These philosophers’ positions have emerged in intellectual contexts, of course, and 
have not arisen ex nihilo.
5 Alternatively, an account from a non-scientific source that is not (presumably) avail-
able or even imaginable, such as those propounded by religions, may in the same way 
provide a solution non-philosophically, but it goes without saying that the question 
whether such an account is at all possible is not universally answered in the affirm-
ative.
6 Perhaps a basic error is to presume that a definitive account, one that transcends 
the various approaches under the general banner of epistemology, is possible at all. 
These approaches are all characterized by some feature that is not shared universally 
(those known as ‘coherentists’ disagreeing with those whose view is dubbed ‘founda-
tionalist’, for example, or those who present an ‘internalist’ approach with those who 
adhere to an ‘externalist’ outlook). This is an important issue, but not pursued here.
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has come under fire in the light of the observations Gettier has famously put 
forward.7 This problematization of ‘knowledge’ has in its turn led to many 
responses, such as the idea that knowledge is available as long as conclusive 
reasons are present.8
It is difficult to establish where this process (and many others in philosophy) 
would end. What I mean is the following. If an account is provided that seems 
plausible, such as the notion that knowledge is true, justified belief, but which 
is then (seemingly) refuted by another (supposedly superior) one, which is then 
itself (seemingly) refuted, at what point is the right (or ‘right’) account given? 
And how is one to determine this? Applied to the present example, there are 
those who will cling to a pre-Gettier notion of knowledge, those who accept 
Gettier’s arguments, and those who will provide their own alternative, without 
some impartial party to establish once and for all which explanation is right (in 
this (alleged) case not ‘right’ but actually right, since a (purportedly) objective 
point of view must be the case here, lest the discussion be reduced to an intellec-
tual game, a possibility that cannot, incidentally, outrightly be dismissed). An 
additional difficulty is that the human perspective, from which it seems hard or 
impossible to escape, serves as the standard, so one seems unable to determine 
whether the objective perspective, presuming it exists, is reached.
The most likely outcome, if a radical alternative such as Rorty’s9 is dis-
missed, is that that the various positions will continue to exist next to one an-
other, in the worst scenario even leading to subdisciplines in philosophy, just as 
philosophy has demonstrated from the end of the Middle Ages, culminating (so 
far at least) in the present era. This would not be an unwelcome development 
as long as there were some justification, such as in the field of medicine, whose 
expansion in such diverse areas as nephrology, radiology and psychiatry is due 
to the fact that physicians are not supposed to be able to oversee or master each 
treatment, as I pointed out above. The same can be said for the other sciences. 
It is precisely such a justification which is not a given in philosophy. In its case, 
there is no replacement of theories by one another, which are presumably their 
superiors, but an ever ongoing accretion of new theories without an abandon-
ment of the old. Such theories are not discarded; at most, something formerly 
considered philosophical is considered to be scientific once it can be corrob-
orated or refuted on the basis of empirical data, and unless writings are lost 
because of unrelated factors such as natural disasters (a minor issue in a digital 
age), they will not become merely historically interesting, such as their scientific 
counterparts that are now considered outdated. In the knowledge case (and 
others) the question looms what it would matter which party is right. Suppose 
the question what knowledge is were ‘resolved’ in a way acceptable for everyone 
7 Gettier 1963, passim.
8 Dretske 1971, passim.
9 Rorty 1980, 264: “[…] the notion of philosophy as having foundations is as mistaken 
as that of knowledge having foundations.”
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(in that they would all agree and be able to provide the evidence to support the 
‘resolve’), what would be gained? It is clear that it would not matter to scientists, 
who may or may not use an implicit (unclear) notion of knowledge, and whose 
pursuits are not in the least affected by these definitional matters, as they may 
be called. Scientists do not have to immerse themselves in philosophy, nor are 
they anxiously awaiting philosophers’ debates’ outcomes before starting their 
own research.
For philosophers themselves, it would simply mean that they would turn 
their attention to other matters to be ‘resolved’. Their pursuits can, then, be 
likened to the solving of crossword puzzles, which are no longer of interest once 
all the squares are filled. This is, of course, a hypothetical scenario, since, again, 
a philosophical issue does not seem to be resolved unless in the literal sense, 
i. e., when it disappears, because it has become part of a science. In time, many 
of the discussions in philosophy will perhaps lead to the same derision that the 
scholastic philosophers’ debates received from their successors. To return to 
the matter adumbrated above, about the necessary characteristics (or ‘essence’, 
to use the once popular vernacular) of knowledge, it would seem that James’s 
observation with regard to ‘truth’ applies (mutatis mutandis): “What difference 
would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were 
true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives 
mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is 
serious, we ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow 
from one side or the other’s being right.”10 ‘Truth’ is then to be approached as 
follows: “Purely objective truth, truth in whose establishment the function of 
giving human satisfaction in marrying previous parts of experience with newer 
parts played no rôle whatever, is nowhere to be found. The reasons why we call 
things true is the reason why they are true, for ‘to be true’ means only to per-
form this marriage-function.”11
Scientists, in line with this observation, take the reverse attitude vis-à-vis 
‘knowledge’ to those philosophers that do not adhere to a pragmatic outlook. 
Scientists need not first establish what knowledge is, so that they may differen-
tiate between ‘true’ and ‘untrue’ statements; rather, they have their own meth-
ods on the basis of which they determine what is true and what, accordingly, 
constitutes knowledge. Knowledge is a result rather than a starting-point in 
the process. This procedural difference between the sciences on the one hand 
and (non-pragmatic) philosophy on the other explains why sciences can make 
progress12 and philosophy cannot (as I intimated above, as soon as a science 
10 James 1975, Lecture II, p. 28.
11 James 1975, Lecture II, p. 37.
12 I have already pointed to the difficulties involved with this notion and will merely 
remark that a critical stance vis-à-vis the sciences is no less warranted than in the 
case of philosophy and that one may perhaps say that “[…] it is only during periods 
of normal science that progress seems both obvious and assured.” (Kuhn 1996, 163), 
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provides an answer to a philosophical quandary, the issue is perhaps not to be 
considered philosophical anymore). As long as philosophers utilize their own 
notions of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’, they will remain confined to the concep-
tual prisons they have fabricated for themselves. It resembles the situation in 
which a scientist would introduce notions to his field of research that he can 
never corroborate or refute.13 Scientists steer clear of such a course of action, 
of course, realizing that it would be useless, a useful outcome being their goal. 
As long as philosophers fail to adopt the same standard, their discussions will 
remain seemingly relevant only for themselves, and not even that (but rather 
irrelevant), once they start to reflect on these discussions in addition to the 
topics they ponder.
2. Salvaging philosophy
The critical observations put forward in section 1 should not be taken to entail 
that philosophy (or rather all philosophy) is useless. First, one may point to 
some fields of study that are not evidently without use, on account of their 
being aids to other fields of inquiry, such as logic and argumentation theory. 
Second, philosophy points out the various starting-points used in the sciences, 
of which their practitioners may not always be sufficiently aware, so that scien-
tists’ critical stance may be incited.
Third, not unrelated to the second point, philosophy is pre-eminently the 
domain to reflect on the use of enterprises such as scientific pursuits, but, more 
broadly, life itself. Confrontational questions, such as the one why one should 
be involved in specific ambitions, or, more radically, why one should propagate 
or even continue to live, are not answered by the sciences, which may be said 
not to reflect at all. After all, scientific pursuits are usually not problematized, 
nor need they be: one’s objective is clear, at least roughly, and the fact that this 
may change in the course of the actual research does not derogate from this 
basic given. In fact, it is precisely this from which scientists derive the justifica-
tion of their pursuits, whereas philosophers find the justification of theirs (inter 
alia) in their very reflection on these pursuits. The non-abating critical stance 
vis-à-vis anything, including scientific activities, keeps philosophy from being 
a trivial pursuit.
This position is, however, at risk of becoming unattainable, in the light of 
what I pointed out in section 1. As philosophical issues become more specialized, 
‘normal science’ meaning here “[…] the research firmly based upon one or more past 
scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community ac-
knowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice.” (Kuhn 
1996, 10).
13 Thus acting against Popper’s precept that an empirical system should be falsifiable 
(Popper 1962, 92).
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they will become devoid of use, or even of meaning. The sciences specialize too, 
but in their case, this is a consequence of the external elements mentioned, a 
situation which does not apply to philosophy (for if it did, philosophy would no 
longer exist but be reduced to one or several sciences14). Should philosophy go 
the way of the sciences, it can no longer act as their critical observer and relativ-
ize their claims. Philosophy will, if it will continue to develop as it has over the 
last decade, cease to be a single discipline but rather fall apart into separate fields 
such as epistemology, ethics and logic. I say ‘separate’, for although these sub-
disciplines are of course already acknowledged, there is still a common frame 
of reference that unites them, even though this already seems to be faltering.15 
This can only be maintained if one remembers why the philosophical matters 
that are investigated are of interest in the first place.
It is important to realize that the ability of philosophy to provide a ‘grand 
narrative’ (philosophy in the ‘classical’ sense) is the only justification for its 
presence (save for the first two points adumbrated in the beginning of this 
section, but their value is a merely instrumental one, and, besides, scientists 
who take their own enterprise seriously do not need philosophers for them to 
maintain a critical stance). One may deny that such a narrative is possible,16 
but this would surely bring philosophy’s end (in the sense of its ending) with it. 
(Such a position is not, by the way, incorrect on the basis that its outcome is un-
desirable; this would be a clear example of an argumentum ad consequentiam.)
A philosophical enterprise such as Fichte’s, which aspires to allot to philoso-
phy the role of determining the nature of the sciences,17 or a stance such as Des-
cartes’s, who famously likens philosophy to a tree whose roots are metaphysics, 
and whose trunk is physics, the branches springing from it constituting all the 
other sciences,18 is no longer representative of the relation between philosophy 
and the sciences. Thinkers such as Descartes and Fichte, who devise complete 
philosophical systems, may have contemporary epigones, but if these should 
consider philosophy’s stance in a similar way as their precursors did, they would 
have a hard time defending their position against those accusing them of ad-
14 That this is philosophy’s path is, incidentally, pleaded by Quine (1969, 75 – 78, 
82 – 84), but he focuses on only part of what philosophy is, so that his analysis is too 
narrow to conclude that philosophy is already ‘dissolved’.
15 A possible explanation for this is that this frame of reference may be said to have a 
negative origin, namely that what these fields have in common is that they have not 
(or not yet) been adopted by the sciences (although they may serve a supportive role 
(e. g. logic for mathematics)).
16 Notably Lyotard 1979, passim.
17 Fichte 1965, § 2 (123); cf. § 3 (127, 128), philosophy itself being characterized a science 
in his system of thought, by the way (§ 1 (112), § 2 (120), §3 (128)), and logic being a 
separate discipline from philosophy (§ 6 (137)).
18 Descartes 1964, 14. His ambition also becomes apparent in the very title of another 
work: Discours de la Methode pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la verité dans les 
sciences (original spelling).
 Philosophy’s End 611
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, Band 66 (2012), 4
hering to air castles of their own making. This is not to say that philosophy 
should not be engaged in a grand narrative – it may in fact be argued that this 
is the only way it can avoid a swift demise along the line sketched above19 –, 
but merely that its pretence concerning scientific enterprises must be mitigated.
Possibly no less important in practice than this is the way literature is in-
corporated into one’s writings. Ideally, references to publications would appear 
only if their presence is relevant. This remark would seem to speak for itself. Yet 
many referees of prospective publications expect writers to include recent litera-
ture in which their subject matter is dealt with, even if such an inclusion would 
add nothing to the point one is trying to make, so that the publication gains 
nothing in import by adding such virtually mandatory ‘ornaments’ whose pres-
ence serves decorative purposes only. Such a stance needs to be relinquished if 
philosophy is to be kept from losing its common frame of reference (and, in the 
wake of this development, be annihilated).20 After all, the more one is focused 
on the current debates in one’s particular field, the less one is able to keep an 
overview (let alone to follow (globally) the developments in other disciplines), 
especially if such a focus leads to an inclusion of only the latest publications, the 
‘classical’ books and articles serving merely as intellectual scenery.
Relevant literature must be used, of course, but simply mentioning it for the 
sake of demonstrating that one is aware of the fact that others are involved in 
the same discussion is neither a productive nor a sensible course of action. In 
the case illustrated above, scientists are not in the least concerned about phi-
losophers’ attempts to define knowledge, but an encompassing position that 
includes observations with a basis in both epistemology and the philosophy of 
science may alternatively be of value. Such a position is on the verge of becom-
ing unattainable, if philosophy should indeed proceed in the same way as the 
sciences have.
Fourth, there are fields such as ethics and meta-ethics which cannot, it 
seems, be incorporated in such a way into one or several sciences that they 
would be emancipated from philosophy, as it were.21 What I mentioned above 
with regard to the abundance of literature applies here, too. One must focus on 
the crucial issues, lest the discussions should lose their value.22 An example of 
19 Crucially, one should, of course, not introduce such a narrative in order to salvage 
philosophy, which would be a most incredible way to operate.
20 I leave it to the reader to decide whether I have managed to avoid this myself and the 
present article has not succumbed to the same problem and must request him or her 
to base the judgment on the given that I have earnestly attempted to include only 
those references that actually contribute something.
21 From a meta-ethical point of view, problems can be raised regarding the status of 
some (or all) of the pivotal notions in ethics, but that does not mean that ethical 
questions lose their import. Since this is not the place to deal with this matter, I 
must limit myself here to mentioning that they must, in the light of such problems, 
be considered critically.
22 This carries an ambiguity in the case of ethics.
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such an issue is given above, viz., why one should be concerned with scientific 
or philosophical issues at all (provided that they do not – immediately – lead to 
an increase of pleasure or a decrease of pain). Philosophy can, then, be salvaged, 
but only if it moves counterclockwise to the sciences, whose merit consists in 
ever new discoveries, which carries with it the continual need to specialize and 
even subdivide, whereas its presence is justified by its ability to reflect, an ac-
tivity that can only remain of use if one steers clear from a similar path as that 
of the sciences.
Conclusion
Philosophical debates are not necessarily useless, but in order to keep philoso-
phy from becoming a futile enterprise, it must follow its own path. This means 
that the consequences of far-reaching specializations must be acknowledged. 
Sciences are forced to follow this course, in the wake of their progression. This 
is not the case with philosophy, and in its case, radical specializations would 
even be detrimental. Its discussions would be reduced to attempts to solve puz-
zles whose outcomes would be of interest to no-one save those philosophers 
engaged in them, and even for them it would be nothing but the intellectual 
gratification of finding a consistent and elegant outcome that would be at stake. 
As long as it is still possible to avert this outcome (or, more cynically, to halt 
its decline), a plea for a renewed focus on the relevant issues in philosophy is 
in order.
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